

Administrative - Internal Use Only

Note to: [03]
CE/EXU

9/11/97

Subject: ARRB interview of Russell A. Langelles

Attached is a draft of Michelle Combs' memorandum of her interview of Langelles. This memo is for the Assassination Records Review Board's files and will be made available to the public. Ms. Combs is willing to consider alterations in response to problems the Agency has with the draft, however, she indicated that the information contained in the memo is in the public domain. If you have any questions please contact me via E-mail or on 31825 secure. Please respond as soon as possible. Ms Combs would like to address any questions we have before she forwards the draft to Jeremy Gunn, General Counsel, ARRB, which she hopes to do this week.

Thanks,

[03]

Billy Harrison
JFK Project Officer
CSI/HRG

CIA SPECIAL COLLECTIONS
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Interview with
8/21/97

- no contact w/LHO
- sent to Moscow to meet Popov, strict cover security. Popov #1 priority
- other responsibilities incl. finding, checking, locating dead drops, general assessment
No recruiting b/c of risk of drawing attention as CIA and endangering Popov.
- first hand of LHO with assassination
- loose supervision of other officers in embassy, knew generally what they were doing but no specifics
- knew about the legal traveller program but had no contact, maybe Winters did, seems likely
- likely that Winters + possibly others had their own channels to Hqs, he was never given a message for them or sent a message to Hqs from them
- others all OKR (DI) major competition for slots between DO/DI. State did not want any CIA slots but DI slots most palatable to them.

- Defectors and tourists not his responsibility. CI not with defectors not enough to blow his cover. No contact with any.
- Possible military attaches would have met with a defector with military background. They could have taken him to the upper floors for ~~some~~ counselling.
- no contact / instructions from Angleton
- no knowledge of ~~the~~ U-2 until his return
- Only person in embassy who knew our non pouch mail was read by both Soviets and CIA through HTLINGUAL.
- His job after Moscow was ^{Head of} VIP Protection for Dept of State Security - a cooling off period.
- "Station" files in Moscow only filled 1 drawer of a 4 drawer safe in his office. No one else had the special combination to that drawer. Files consisted mostly of commo stuff (one time pads etc.), dead drop locations, and communications protocol.

~~SECRET~~

**APPROVED FOR RELEASE 1993
CIA HISTORICAL REVIEW PROGRAM**

File HSCA

5 May 1978

MEMORANDUM FOR: Mr. Rodger S. Gabrielson
Office of Legislative Counsel,
Coordination and Review Staff

FROM : Norbert A. Shepanek
Office of the Special Assistant
to the DDO for External Oversight

SUBJECT : Response to Reference

REFERENCE : OLC 78-1690/1, 26 April 1978

1. The following is a list of senior officers assigned
to [REDACTED] during the period indicated per reference request:

Mr. Russell Langelie
(currently employed) [REDACTED]

Mr. George Payne Winters, Jr.
(DOB: 1 June 1920) [REDACTED]
Resigned mid-May 1961 to
complete PH.D. at Columbia
University

[REDACTED] (resigned) [REDACTED]
Berkeley Springs, W.Va.

Mr. Paul Garbler (retired) [REDACTED]
1503 Snughill Court
Vienna, Va. 22180
Tele: 356-4650
([REDACTED])

Mr. Hugh Montgomery [REDACTED]
(currently employed
overseas and under cover)

[REDACTED]
(currently employed
overseas and under cover)

E2 IMPDET CL BY 062028

~~SECRET~~

#06265

~~SECRET~~

[REDACTED]
(currently employed Hqs)

[REDACTED]
(currently employed Hqs)

2. The following were Chiefs of the Soviet Division during the periods indicated:

Mr. John M. Maury (retired) 1 Dec 54 - 29 Jul 62
3704 Farr Avenue
Fairfax, Va.

Mr. Howard J. Osborn (retired) 30 Jul 62 - 15 Sep 63
(may be contacted through
his attorney Mr. Jack
Debelius, 948-6727)

Mr. David E. Murphy (retired) 16 Sep 63 - 10 Mar 68
1537 Forest Villa Lane
McLean, Va.
Tele: 356-9523

3. According to the records available to us, there were no DO officers assigned to Atsugi Base between 1956 and 1960. This was a support base staffed by support personnel during that period.

4. Interviews will be arranged for currently employed personnel at Headquarters at the convenience of HSCA staff. Special arrangements can be made for personnel currently employed and overseas. Personnel who have resigned or retired should be contacted directly by HSCA investigators.

5. Please note that we consider the information in paragraph 1 very sensitive, and we would like to be consulted, per our agreement, prior to actual contact by the HSCA staff.

for *David P. Gregg*
Norbert A. Shepanek

~~SECRET~~

MEMORANDUM

April 8, 1997

To: Michelle Combs
cc- Jeremy Gunn

From: Joe Freeman

Subject: Report of April 4, 1997 Interview with Paul Garbler

Introduction and Summary

I met with Mr. Garbler at his home in Tucson, Arizona, in the late morning and early afternoon of Friday, April 4, 1997. I arrived at his home at the appointed time -- 11:00 AM -- and we had some fifteen minutes of general and introductory conversation (most consisting of me explaining the origins, purpose and statutory responsibilities of the Review Board in response to queries from Mr. Garbler) before we were interrupted by a phone call that Mr. Garbler had evidently been expecting and which consumed the next 60-70 minutes. During this time I remained in Mr. Garbler's office/den. I noted a copy of the Warren Commission Report on Mr. Garbler's bookshelves, as well as a copy of *Case Closed*. There were numerous books concerning the Soviet Union, intelligence issues, history of U.S. and Soviet intelligence agencies, etc. It is clear that Mr. Garbler maintains an active interest in intelligence issues and the history of U.S.-Soviet relations. At approximately 12:20 PM, Mr. Garbler's phone call ended, whereupon he excused himself to make some coffee. He returned shortly thereafter and we began our interview proper at approximately 12:30 PM. Mr. Garbler readily granted his permission to tape the interview (unfortunately, due to my incompetence and lack of attentiveness to the tape recorder, only some one-third of the interview was actually recorded), though I also took contemporaneous notes. The interview lasted approximately an hour and a half, ending about 2:00 PM. At 79 years of age, Mr. Garbler remains articulate and focused.

While fascinating, the interview yielded no substantive bombshells. Mr. Garbler stated that he had never heard of Lee Harvey Oswald prior to President Kennedy's assassination, and that the Moscow station had no interactions with Oswald during his tenure as Chief of Station (COS). Nor did the station monitor Oswald in any way during his stay in the Soviet Union. Mr. Garbler stated that James Angleton was not operationally involved with the Moscow station, and that to the best of his knowledge Angleton never ran any agents or assets of his own in the Soviet Union during Garbler's

MEMORANDUM FOR P.L. 102-526 (JFK ACT)
NARA EW
DATE 7/27/97

Memo to Michelle Combs, re: Garbler interview
April 8, 1997
Page 2

tenure as COS.¹ At the same time, Garbler stated that Angleton "was not above that sort of thing," acknowledging that it was theoretically possible that Angleton might have run agents or assets in the Soviet Union without Garbler's knowledge.² Garbler does not seem to believe this happened, however. Mr. Garbler declined to provide the identities or even the exact number of CIA officers working under cover at the Moscow embassy during his tenure as COS. He did state that there were *no* CIA officers at the embassy at the time of his arrival in November of 1961. The only CIA officer in Moscow whose name Mr. Garbler mentioned was his Deputy Chief of Station, Hugh Montgomery. Mr. Garbler was unable to shed light on the roles of either Richard Snyder or John McVickar (both having left Moscow before his arrival). Nor could he offer any assistance in nailing down the physical layout of the ground floor of the embassy: his recollection of the ground floor was so unclear that he declined to attempt a sketch of its layout. In his more general physical description of the embassy, however, Mr. Garbler provided information which both supplemented and sometimes contradicted the statements made by Idar Rimestad during the latter's interview of March 25, 1997.³ One of the most relevant aspects of the interview was the adamancy with which Garbler maintained that the status and activities of American defectors in the Soviet Union were *not* issues of concern to the Moscow station he set up.

¹ Garbler recounted the events chronicled in David Wise's *Molehunt* wherein Angleton had asked Garbler, before the latter's departure for Moscow, to pick up messages that might be left for him by a contact of Angleton's in Moscow. Since this individual was an FBI asset, and Angleton's role -- through Garbler -- was one of simply facilitating communication with him, Garbler did not consider this asset as having been run "by" Angleton. The rest of Garbler's retelling of these events was consistent with the account laid out by Wise.

² This awareness, or belief -- that Angleton could and did run assets on his own -- was behind the confrontation Garbler had with Angleton in Stockholm in 1956 (as recounted in *Molehunt* on page 62): Garbler assumed at the time that the message Angleton wanted to send from the Stockholm station followed upon an Angleton contact with an asset in Sweden that the CI chief was running without the station's knowledge.

³ See "Report of March 25, 1997 Interview with Idar Rimestad", memo from Joe Freeman to Michelle Combs, dated March 26, 1997 (032697.wpd).

MEMORANDUM FOR P.L.-102-526(JFK ACT)
DATE 6-18-02
Memo to Michelle Combs, re: Garbler interview

April 8, 1997

Page 3

Interview Report

In my meeting with Mr. Garbler, I hewed closely to your "Proposed Topic Questions for Paul Garbler Interview" (Combs t:\wp-docs\garbler1.wpd). Accordingly, this report reflects the topic order as laid out in your questions.

Headquarters - Mr. Garbler informed me that his position in the Soviet Russia Division (prior to his posting to Moscow) was "Chief of Foreign Intelligence" and that he was not "branch chief of SR/10" as my first question to him had stated.⁴ He stated that he had never encountered Lee Harvey Oswald's name while in this position. In fact, he volunteered that he had never heard of Oswald in any connection prior to President Kennedy's assassination. Mr. Garbler stated that he was very familiar with the legal travelers program (especially from his stint at the Stockholm station) and that legal travelers were not asked to perform operational tasks. In fact, Mr. Garbler stated that legal travelers were actually cautioned against doing anything out of the ordinary for fear of their drawing undue attention to themselves. When asked if this general rule was a hard and fast one, Mr. Garbler replied: "Passive observance was the name of the game: do nothing out of pattern."⁵ Mr. Garbler stated that he had never seen Richard Snyder's cable concerning the defection of Oswald, nor any other document referencing Oswald, either in his capacity as Chief of Foreign Intelligence for the SR Division, nor as part of his preparation for his posting to Moscow as COS. I asked several questions in an effort to get a better handle on what material he *did* see in Washington during the 4-6 week period after he learned he was going to Moscow but before he left. I specifically asked him whether he reviewed files relating to -- or was briefed on -- American defectors to the Soviet Union. He replied in the negative. He stated at one point that he knew "very little" about American defectors in the Soviet Union, and at another that he knew "nothing" about them. He stated that his most important task in going to Moscow was running Oleg Penkovsky; his second most important task was the setting up of a functioning and effective station. Checking on American defectors resident in the Soviet Union was "not in my charter" and the issue "was never mentioned" to him as a task he or the new station was charged with undertaking. Mr. Garbler stated this last point very strongly. He said that, even *had* someone tasked him with sending

⁴ And as John Newman states on page 59 of *Oswald and the CIA*.

⁵ Garbler's statement on this issue is consistent with what he told John Newman: "We would brief them to be passively aware. They were not supposed to take specific actions, but sometimes this rule was violated." (John Newman, *Oswald and the CIA*, p. 59). It is unclear in Newman's text whether such violations were initiated at the request of the Agency or undertaken independently by the travelers.

MEMORANDUM FOR P.L.-102-526 (JFK ACT)
NARA BW DATE 6-18-02

Memo to Michelle Combs, re: Garbler interview

April 8, 1997

Page 4

someone to Minsk to check up on Oswald, he would not have thought it important enough to do so: according to Mr. Garbler, Oswald "was a nothing thing until he shot Kennedy" and Garbler would not have wasted scarce station resources on him.

Background Information on Moscow - Mr. Garbler stated that he arrived in Moscow in November of 1961 (*Molehunt* puts the precise date as November 30, 1961).⁶ He was sent to Moscow as the CIA's first Chief of Station at the Moscow embassy, but his cover at the embassy was that of assistant naval attache. Mr. Garbler stated that preserving cover was "so much of a problem" in Moscow that he spent "at least" one-third of his time performing duties associated with his cover as assistant naval attache. His cover position required frequent travel outside of Moscow, but he stated that he was able to arrange to be in Moscow anytime anything important was expected to happen regarding the Penkovsky case. While stationed in Moscow, Garbler lived in the embassy on the third floor on what he described as the embassy's north wing (see section on "Embassy Details, 1959"). Mr. Garbler declined to state how many CIA officers were stationed at the embassy during his tenure as COS, but he did maintain that there were *no* CIA officers at the embassy prior to his arrival in November of 1961.⁷ I pressed him on this assertion, but he was adamant that all previous CIA interventions in the Soviet Union had been "singletons"-- agents sent into the Soviet Union by the CIA on a "target of opportunity, catch-as-catch can basis... without the knowledge of

⁶ It should be noted that the Foreign Service listings provided to me list Garbler's posting date as *August 31, 1961*. This is inconsistent with both Garbler's recollection and the account in *Molehunt*. It would be useful to determine: 1) whether the Foreign Service listing is incorrect, 2) whether it references the date of an appointment as opposed to an actual arrival date, or, 3) otherwise explain the discrepancy.

⁷ Initially, Garbler stated that his Deputy Chief of Station, Hugh Montgomery, had arrived in Moscow before he had, and that therefore there had been one CIA officer in place before his, Garbler's, arrival. Subsequently, he amended this recollection and stated that Montgomery had arrived subsequent to his own posting; therefore it is Garbler's contention that there were no CIA officers at the embassy prior to his arrival. Garbler's amended recollection, re: Montgomery's arrival, is confirmed by the July, 1962, Foreign Service listing, which indicates Montgomery's posting date as February 4, 1962. Garbler stated that Montgomery was in charge of security at the embassy, and that Montgomery's predecessor in this position was John Abidian (who was at the embassy when Garbler got there). This also squares with the Foreign Service listings, as Abidian's posting date is listed as February 7, 1960 in the January, 1962, listing, whereas Abidian is not listed at all in the July and October, 1962 listings (where Montgomery's name appears).

Memo to Michelle Combs, re: Garbler interview
April 8, 1997
Page 5

the embassy...[and] completely unsupported except for a very tenuous line back to Langley." While Mr. Garbler stated that he was as well prepared to take up his duties in Moscow as time allowed, he also stated his opinion that "it was not necessary for me to know what had transpired with the singletons, most of which were failures, except as an object lesson in what not to do." I raised with Mr. Garbler an anecdote recounted in *Molehunt*, presumably based on information he had previously given to David Wise, which relates how Ambassador Llewellyn Thompson summoned Mr. Garbler into the embassy's secure "bubble" shortly after his (Garbler's) arrival in Moscow in order to query him about who else in the embassy were undercover CIA officers. The clear implication in Wise's account was that there *were* other CIA officers in the embassy at the time of Thompson's interrogation of Garbler, though not many.⁸ Mr. Garbler insisted to me, notwithstanding what may have been written in *Molehunt*, that there were no CIA officers in the embassy prior to his arrival. Mr. Garbler acknowledged that, subsequently, some number of CIA officers were brought in, but he declined to state how many. He also stated that, as COS, he had a good relationship with Ambassador Thompson and had, in fact, briefed him in Washington about plans to open the station prior to his own (Garbler's) arrival in Moscow. Mr. Garbler also confirmed that the Moscow station was an especially clandestine one (this is consistent with Idar Rimestad's recollection, for instance) and that far fewer individuals at the embassy would have been aware of which co-workers were undercover CIA officers, as compared with embassies elsewhere. Mr. Garbler stated that James Angleton had no operational role vis-a-vis the Moscow station. When asked to describe the level of Angleton's involvement in the day-to-day running of the station, Mr. Garbler replied: "not at all." Mr. Garbler stated that, as COS, he took his direction from the Soviet Russia Division, not Angleton. He allowed as how Angleton could have impacted the station's operations at one remove, by influencing the direction it got from the Soviet Russia Division. But Mr. Garbler does not believe this was much of a factor: "I did not perceive his [Angleton's] hand." Nor, to the best of Mr. Garbler's knowledge, did Angleton run any agents or assets in the Soviet Union during Garbler's tenure as COS. The only exception (though Mr. Garbler does not view it as such) was the single instance -- recounted at length in *Molehunt* -- where Angleton had requested that Garbler service a dead-drop in Moscow where a message might be left by a FBI asset who had returned to the Soviet Union from the United States. Mr. Garbler's account of this episode closely paralleled the version in *Molehunt*; he also offered that the asset in question was either "Tophat" or "Fedora," but that he couldn't quite recall which was which after all these years. Mr. Garbler made clear that he did not consider this episode a genuine case of Angleton running agents in the Soviet Union. As Mr. Garbler sees it,

⁸ See *Molehunt*, p. 51. I recounted the anecdote to Garbler from memory; I did not locate it in the book and confront him with it in black and white.

MEMO P.L.-102-526(JFK ACT)
DATE 6-18-02
Memo to Michelle Combs, re: Garbler interview
April 8, 1997
Page 6

the asset in question was an FBI asset and Angleton -- in his capacity as CIA liaison with the FBI -- was merely attempting to comply with a request from the Bureau that the Agency facilitate their staying in touch with their asset when he returned to the Soviet Union. Mr. Garbler stated that he regarded this instance as an "informal" association with Angleton. He stated that he did not inform the Soviet Russia Division of this episode, and that this was because Angleton had made it clear to him that this operation was to be very tightly held. At the same time as he disavowed knowing of any Angleton agents in the Soviet Union, Mr. Garbler acknowledged that Angleton "was not above that sort of thing." While conceding the theoretical possibility that Angleton ran agents in the Soviet Union while he (Garbler) was COS, Mr. Garbler left me with the strong impression that he thought this possibility unlikely. When asked if there were any back-channel means of communication between Headquarters and the Moscow station, Mr. Garbler stated that there none that he was aware of, though he volunteered that there was always a possibility that some of the other CIA officers at the station communicated independently with the Soviet Russia Division when they traveled back to the United States, or when their tour of duty took them elsewhere. (In this context, I took "independently" to mean without Garbler's knowledge or supervision as COS). Finally, Mr. Garbler had no recollection of John McVickar, Richard Snyder, Marie Cheatham or Verna Deane Brown, and so could offer nothing on the issue of whether any of them had supplied information to the station.⁹

Oswald - Mr. Garbler made very clear from the outset of the interview that he had never heard of Lee Harvey Oswald prior to the assassination of President Kennedy. Similarly, he stated that he had never seen Oswald at the embassy or anywhere else in the Soviet Union. No one had ever discussed Oswald with him, or mentioned Oswald's name to him, prior to the assassination. Nor does he have any recollection of ever being asked about Oswald *after* the assassination. To the best of his knowledge, Oswald never met with any CIA officers during his visits to the embassy, though Mr. Garbler allowed as how it was theoretically possible that one of his officers could have spontaneously met Oswald in their cover capacities during the latter's 1962 visit to the embassy.¹⁰ If

⁹ Snyder left Moscow in July of 1961; McVickar in September of 1961 -- that is, prior to Garbler's arrival at the embassy. I am unaware of when Cheatham and Brown left Moscow. In any case, Garbler did not remember any of them.

¹⁰ In this context, it must be remembered that Garbler maintains that there were no CIA officers in the embassy prior to his arrival in November of 1961. Therefore, the only known Oswald visit during which any theoretical contact could have taken place was the 1962 visit, shortly before Oswald's departure with his family to the United States.

REPRODUCED AT THE NATIONAL ARCHIVES CASE FILE P.L-102-526 (JFK ACT)
NARA EW DATE 6-18-02

Memo to Michelle Combs, re: Garbler interview
April 8, 1997
Page 7

such an encounter did take place, however, Mr. Garbler was never informed of it. In short, to the best of Mr. Garbler's knowledge, the station had no contact with Oswald at any time during the latter's stay in the Soviet Union. Mr. Garbler has no knowledge of any CIA officers (including non-station officers visiting the Soviet Union) ever making contact with Oswald in the Soviet Union. The station did not monitor Oswald in Minsk, Moscow or anywhere else, according to Mr. Garbler. Finally, Mr. Garbler was in London on November 22, 1963. He received a message to call the London COS, who told him that Headquarters wanted Garbler to return to Moscow ASAP in light of the President's assassination. Mr. Garbler returned to Moscow the next day, November 23rd, where he found embassy staff "confused" and "concerned." Mr. Garbler thought this was a very reasonable state of affairs, given the uncertainty in many people's minds at the time about what the assassination might mean for Soviet-American relations.

Embassy Details, 1959 - Mr. Garbler stated that the embassy could be characterized as having three wings: a central wing, a north wing and a south wing. The central wing housed the embassy's offices and had ten floors, or nine floors and an attic, depending on how one chose to characterize the top floor.¹¹ The north and south wings, says Mr. Garbler, had no more than five or six floors, and housed the residences of those employees who lived on-site. The north wing housed officers, according to Mr. Garbler, while the south wing housed other embassy personnel. Mr. Garbler lived on the third floor of the north wing. Mr. Garbler said the north wing contained some 12-15 apartments which were "very spacious" and "very comfortable." Mr. Garbler's recollection is that there was no intermingling of office and residential space: the central wing was all office space; the north and south wings were strictly residential. Mr. Garbler's office was on the 10th floor (or attic), where the offices of the military attaches were located.¹² The security office, according to Mr. Garbler, was located on the 9th floor, as was the embassy's "secure room" or "bubble". This secure room, or bubble, was, according to Mr. Garbler, the only place in the embassy where a classified

¹¹ Relative to numbers of floors, intermingling or non-intermingling of office and residential space, secure nature of the upper floors, etc., Mr. Garbler's recollections differ significantly from those of Mr. Idar Rimestad, who I interviewed previous to Mr. Garbler. For what it is worth, the author would judge Mr. Garbler's recollections as crisper, and as offered more quickly and less tentatively than Mr. Rimestad's. To that extent, all other things being equal, I would give greater weight to Mr. Garbler's recollections where his and Mr. Rimestad's differ.

¹² Rimestad stated there were only eight floors to the embassy, but his recollection was consistent with Garbler's insofar as Rimestad, after some reflection, believed that the top floor was allocated to the military attaches.

Memo to Michelle Combs, re: Garbler interview
April 8, 1997
Page 8

conversation could be safely held. All other floors and offices, as well as the telephone system, were assumed to be tapped or bugged by the Soviets. This made internal communication inside the embassy laborious and helped account for the extreme compartmentalization of information inside the embassy. Mr. Garbler declined to draw a sketch of the ground floor/consular area of the embassy on the grounds that his recollection of it was so imprecise as to make such an effort worthless. Similarly, he had no information to offer on the physical layout of the consular offices (how many offices, how many desks and where they were, etc.) or job responsibilities of any consular staff (again, Snyder and McVickar had left the embassy before Mr. Garbler arrived in November of 1961). Mr. Garbler stated that there was no physical impediment to an embassy visitor walking to the elevators on the ground floor and getting in to go to an upper floor. But in the unlikely event that no one in the consular area intercepted such a visitor, Mr. Garbler said that in any case military guards were generally posted by the elevator doors on the upper floors. Mr. Garbler stated that it would be "highly unusual" for an embassy visitor to be taken to an upper floor. The only circumstance he could recall which might have generated an exception to the rule would be if the parents of someone stationed on one of the upper floors of the embassy visited Moscow to see their children. (Mr. Garbler proffered this example tentatively, as a possible generic exception to the rule, not as a specific recollection.) Mr. Garbler stressed the relative inviolability of the upper floors by noting that it was very rare for even the spouses of embassy employees to make an appearance in the offices of the upper floors.

Near the close of our interview, I asked Mr. Garbler if he would look at the Foreign Service lists of Moscow embassy employees and identify those who were CIA officers. He declined to do so, whereupon I reassured him that the Review Board's authorizing statute requires that the CIA be given an opportunity to review any Agency equities contained in our interview, and that the CIA would have an opportunity to ask the Board to protect any names the Agency thought sensitive. Mr. Garbler still declined to identify any names, making clear that he did not trust the Agency to make that kind of determination for him. I pointed out to Mr. Garbler that there were several names of CIA officers at the Moscow station in *Molehunt*, and that he had clearly cooperated with author David Wise in that book's writing. He acknowledged that there were names of CIA officers in the book, but that David Wise had not gotten those names from him.¹³

¹³ Garbler stated that David Wise had stayed for a week in a guest room at the Garbler residence during the author's research for *Molehunt*. Garbler indicated that Wise had repeatedly tried to get Garbler to identify specific names of CIA officers, and that Garbler had just as repeatedly refused. Notwithstanding, Garbler expressed a high opinion of Wise and his writings on intelligence issues.

Memo to Michelle Combs, re: Garbler interview
April 8, 1997
Page 9

Mr. Garbler stated that it wasn't always easy to predict the consequences of releasing a CIA officer's name, and that as a matter of personal policy he preferred not to take any chances. He recounted having contributed a photograph (from his time in Berlin in the 1950's) to a book authored by his wife Florence (*CIA Wife*). He stated that he was subsequently criticized for this action, and cited the episode as an example of how sensitive disclosure issues can be.

Finally, Mr. Garbler volunteered the information that, at the very end of his time at CIA, he had been assigned liaison duties with the House Select Committee on Assassinations (HSCA). This was news to me, and we subsequently chatted for a few minutes about the HSCA and its work. Mr. Garbler's retirement date is listed as December 31, 1977 in *Molehunt*, which is consistent with his statement that he had retired before the Committee finished its investigation.

Also toward the close of the interview, I asked Mr. Garbler whether the issue of the assassination of President Kennedy had been raised at all at the time of his testimony before the Senate Intelligence Committee, re: the so-called "Mole Relief Act" (Intelligence Authorization Act of 1981). Mr. Garbler stated that it had not.

040897.wpd



RP/LANGELLE

Assassination Records Review Board
600 E Street NW • 2nd Floor • Washington, DC 20530
(202) 724-0088 • Fax: (202) 724-0457

June 3, 1997

Mr. Russell A. Langelie
863 Jacksonville Street
Arlington, VA 22205

Dear Mr. Langelie:

I am writing you on behalf of the Assassination Records Review Board, an independent Federal Agency established pursuant to the President John F. Kennedy Assassination Records Collection Act, 44 U.S.C. § 2107 (Supp. V 1994). The Review Board, whose members are appointed by the President and confirmed by the Senate, is charged with the responsibility of collecting records and information related to the assassination of President Kennedy. Review Board members and staff are required by law to possess Top Secret, SCI clearances. The Review Board is not seeking to reach any conclusions regarding the assassination, but is primarily concerned with identifying, clarifying, locating, and making available assassination records. I am enclosing some explanatory material about the Review Board and its mandate.

As Michelle Combs mentioned in her telephone call last Tuesday, we would like very much to discuss your work experiences in Moscow from 1957-1959 with you. We believe that your past in-depth knowledge of the Moscow Embassy and its procedures may assist the ARRB in our attempts to clarify the historical record in this area.

Before talking with you, we would like to make certain that you would feel free to discuss fully all relevant aspects of your work in Moscow. To the extent that you think that discussion of your work might possibly involve classified or sensitive matters, we would like to resolve such concerns in a way that would provide you with whatever assurance that you need that you would not be improperly divulging classified information. If you feel discussing this subject with the Review Board would constitute disclosure of any information that is still classified, we will be happy to initiate a discussion between you and the appropriate officials to address any concerns you may have.

One of the members of our staff, Michelle Combs, will be calling to arrange a mutually agreeable time and place for an interview. Should you wish to contact us in response to



Assassination Records Review Board
600 E Street NW • 2nd Floor • Washington, DC 20530
(202) 724-0088 • Fax: (202) 724-0457

August 11, 1997

Mr. Robert I. Owen
266 Wall Street
West Longbranch, NJ

Dear Mr. Owen:

I am writing to thank you for providing assistance to the Assassination Records Review Board. A call report of our conversation on August 7, 1997 has been placed in the records of the Board and will be sent to the National Archives and Records Administration in College Park, Maryland for inclusion in the JFK Collection. We appreciate your help in clarifying the historical record.

As Michelle Combs explained, the Assassination Records Review Board is an independent Federal agency established pursuant to the President John F. Kennedy Assassination Records Collection Act, 44 U.S.C. § 2107 (Supp. V 1994). The Review Board, whose members were appointed by the President and confirmed by the Senate, is charged with the responsibility of collecting records and information related to the assassination of President Kennedy. The Review Board members and staff are required by law to possess Top Secret and SCI clearances. The Review Board is not seeking to reach any conclusions regarding the assassination, but is primarily concerned with identifying, clarifying, locating, and making available information about the assassination. I am enclosing some explanatory material about the Review Board and its mandate.

We would appreciate your making available to us copies of the Moscow Embassy telephone directory for June 1959, December 1959, February 1961, and February 1962. These copies will also become part of the Board's records and be placed in the JFK Collection at NARA.

BOARD MEMBERS: John R. Tunheim, Chair • Henry F. Graff • Kermit L. Hall • William L. Joyce • Anna K. Nelson
EXECUTIVE DIRECTOR: David G. Marwell

Withdrawn Item

from the records of the
JFK Assassination Records Review Board

Case Number: NND99303K
Series: Gunn
Box #: 3
Folder: RP/moscow
Date: n.d.
Subject: Proposed Topic Questions
Pages: 2

Authority: *PL 102-526*

§6(1) _____	Special Media _____
§6(2) _____	Other _____
§6(3) _____	CIA
§6(4) _____	
§6(5) _____	



FY
Assassination Records Review Board
600 E Street NW • 2nd Floor • Washington, DC 20001
(202) 724-0088 • Fax: (202) 724-0089

RP/
Langelle

June 23, 1997

Mr. David Petree
Director
National Personnel Records Center
9700 Page Avenue
St. Louis, Missouri 63132

Dear Mr. Petree:

We request a copy of the Russell A. Langelle personnel file. We have immediate need of this file. Please use our FedEx account number 1787-1451-1 to ensure that we receive it as soon as possible.

As always, we appreciate your assistance.

Sincerely,

David G. Marwell
Executive Director

cc: William Bassman, NPRC, Civil Service Records Group

"All the News
That's Fit to Print"

The New York Times

NEWS SUMMARY AND INDEX, PAGE 98

VOL. CIX—No. 37,157.

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Times Square, New York 36, N. Y.

NEW YORK, SUNDAY, OCTOBER 19, 1959

U.S. EMBASSY AIDE OUSTED BY SOVIET ON SPYING CHARGE

Washington Denies Security
Officer Is Guilty—Reports
He Was Threatened

BRIBE OFFER IS ALLEGED

Russians Said to Seize and
Detain the American, Then
Try to Recruit Him

Text of the State Department
statement is on Page 3.

By E. W. KENWORTHY

Special to The New York Times.

WASHINGTON, Oct. 17—The Soviet Union accused the chief security officer of the United States Embassy yesterday of espionage activities and ordered him to leave Moscow. In making this disclosure today, the State Department not only rejected the accusation but also declared that the Soviet action came after five unidentified Russians had kidnapped the American and threatened him and his family and then had tried to blackmail and bribe him to becoming a Soviet espionage agent.

The officer, who has been described as a person non grata by the Soviet Government, is 37 years old, of Long Beach, Calif.

Melodramatic Overtones

Mr. Langel is a civilian. His duties as security officer of the embassy included supervision of the Marine guard detail and responsibility for building and personnel security. There have been many past instances of the Soviet Union's declaring embassy officers "undesirable" on a variety of charges, including espionage. Officials could recall no previous

Eisenhower and Macmillan Want Summit in December

But They Are Reported Adenauer Gets Personal
Letters From Heads of
U. S. and Soviet

Special to The New York Times.
WASHINGTON, Oct. 17—

President Eisenhower and Prime Minister Harold Macmillan of Britain would like a summit meeting during the first two weeks of December, but are meeting some resistance from President Charles de Gaulle of France, officials here said today.

According to these sources, Chancellor Konrad Adenauer of West Germany, who would not attend a heads-of-government meeting but who would be vitally interested in any decisions taken, there, is agreeable to any date decided on by the United States, Britain and France.

There was no confirmation of reports from Bonn that President Eisenhower had written to Dr. Adenauer, Mr. Macmillan and General de Gaulle proposing

Continued on Page 2, Column 3

By SYDNEY GRUSON
Special to The New York Times.

BONN, Germany, Oct. 17—Chancellor Konrad Adenauer received personal letters today from both President Eisenhower and Premier Khrushchev. The letter from the President was believed to concern a possible Western summit conference.

The Chancellor announced receipt of the letters, but he gave no details of their contents.

Associates of Dr. Adenauer denied reports that President Eisenhower's letter proposed a meeting of the Western heads of government this month.

Beyond this they would not go, nor would they comment on reports that the President was thinking in terms of early December for the summit conference with Premier Khrushchev.

The Soviet letter was handed to the Chancellor by Andrei

Continued on Page 2, Column 7

Advanced Research Chief Leaving Post at Pentagon

By JACK RAYMOND
Special to The New York Times.

WASHINGTON, Oct. 17—Roy W. Johnson, head of the Advanced Research Projects Agency of the Defense Department, will resign his post as soon as a successor can be found. Mr. Johnson, who was appointed in February, 1958, plans to become a professional artist. He has been an amateur artist for many years. He is thinking of studying at the National Academy of Art and is planning a one-man exhibit of his paintings.

SHAKE-UP IN CUBA LAID TO UNREST

Raul Castro Given Complete
Control of Armed Forces
—Insurgents Hunted

Mr. Johnson, 54 years old, may leave before Christmas, said to be the approximate date of departure also for Neil H.

AIRPORTS CALLING FOR QUIETER JETS; BACK NEW ENGINE

Adoption of the Turbo-Fan
Urged on Airlines for Less
Noise and More Power

By PETER KIHSS

The nation's airport operators are calling on the aviation industry to take advantage of a new engine to help solve the problem of jet noise.

The new engine, called a turbo-fan, is said to be quieter and more powerful than the turbo-jet. It will go into use early next year.

The turbo-fan engine draws in more cold air than is used in its combustion chamber and ejects gas at a slower speed than does a turbo-jet engine. The lesser speed and the effect of the cold air on the hot gas reduce the noise.

John R. Wiley, president of the Airport Operators Council, said yesterday that a resolution on the turbo-fan had been adopted by the council last Tuesday in San Antonio, Tex. The council's fifty members include airports in New York, Los Angeles, Chicago, Philadelphia, St. Louis and Cincinnati.

The airport operators also said the fact that the new engines have extra power could help in halting the demands for ever-expanding runways for jets.

Warn Against Diversion

They warned against diverting the power gain simply to more speed, range or load just for greater profits.

Mr. Wiley, director of aviation for the Port of New York Authority, said the industry had heretofore "come perilously close to producing aircraft that under certain operating conditions might have approached uselessness in some communities."

The airports' action came after many complaints were made

N. B. C. WILL RETAIN ITS 10 QUIZ SHOWS; CRITICIZES C. B. S.

Cites Popularity of Type of
Show Its Rival Dropped
—Safeguards Planned

By RICHARD F. SHEPARD

The National Broadcasting Company took issue yesterday with the Columbia Broadcasting System's policy in dropping big-prize shows.

"N. B. C. does not accept the premise that all programs offering substantial prizes—whether quiz, panel, audience participation or contest shows—are inherently dishonest," the network said.

"These program forms virtually parallel the life of broadcasting, radio as well as television. Millions of Americans like and want them."

Implicit in its response to the C. B. S. plan was the N. B. C. intention to retain the ten half-hour weekday shows of this type that it now televises.

Three Cancellations Due

Frank Stanton, president of C. B. S., announced the cancellation of the big-prize quiz shows Friday in a speech in New Orleans. The network later announced the immediate dropping of "Top Dollar" and "The Big Pay-off." The future cancellation of "Name That Tune" was also reported.

It was understood, however, that other quiz and panel shows offering lesser prizes would be retained. These include such shows as "I've Got a Secret," "Let's My Line" and "To Tell the Truth."

"It is not clear to N. B. C. at this time how far the C. B. S. action is intended to go," N. B. C. commented yesterday. "If it involves dropping only one or two daytime quiz shows, we do not consider it particularly significant."

Pays Unusual Tribute

In an unusual tribute to a rival network's programs, N. B. C.

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The officer, who has been declared persona non grata by the Soviet Government, is Russell A. Langelle, 37 years old, of Long Beach, Calif.

Melodramatic Overtones

Mr. Langelle is a civilian. His duties as security officer of the Embassy included supervision of the Marine guard detail and responsibility for building and personnel security.

There have been many past instances of the Soviet Union's declaring embassy officers "undesirable" on a variety of charges, including alleged espionage. Officials here could recall no previous ouster, however, with such melodramatic overtones.

What makes the Soviet action all the more remarkable, in the view of officials here, is that it comes while a summit meeting is in prospect and while the Moscow radio is daily evoking "the Camp David spirit" as an augury of the end of the "cold war."

Attempt Called 'Brazen'

While officials here expressed shock and amazement at the "brazen" attempt to blackmail and bribe Mr. Langelle, they did not believe that the case would impede the holding of a summit meeting.

In the past, the United States has retaliated for expulsions of its diplomats by ordering Soviet officials' home. The State Department would not say whether retaliatory action was contemplated.

This is the story of what happened yesterday, as related in the immediate note of protest delivered by the United States Embassy to the Soviet Foreign Ministry.

About 9 A. M., Mr. Langelle

Continued on Page 3, Column 5

Sports News

FOOTBALL

Yale blanked Cornell and Harvard defeated Columbia yesterday. Scores of leading games:

Alabama 7 Tennessee 7
Army 21 Duke 6
Auburn 7 Georgia Tech 6
Boston Col 35 Dartmouth 19

According to these sources, Chancellor Konrad Adenauer of West Germany, who would not attend a heads-of-government meeting but who would be vitally interested in any decisions taken there, is agreeable to any date decided on by the United States, Britain and France.

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SHAKE-UP IN CUBA LAID TO UNREST

Raul Castro Given Complete Control of Armed Forces—Insurgents Hunted

By R. HART PHILLIPS

Special to The New York Times.

HAVANA, Oct. 17—Premier Fidel Castro has placed his younger brother, Maj. Raul Castro, in direct control of the armed forces to meet the threat of increasing counter-revolutionary activity.

As Minister of the Armed Forces, the 28-year-old Major Castro has Cabinet rank. By simultaneously abolishing the Ministry of National Defense, Premier Castro apparently eliminated the possibility of Government interference with his brother's actions.

Major Castro previously was commander in chief of the armed forces.

Departments Are Divided

"The Ministry of National Defense was in the worst condition of abandonment, from both technical and administrative viewpoints, and had been converted into merely a bureaucratic organization," according to an official statement issued after a Cabinet meeting last night.

Several departments of the Defense Ministry were divided among the Institute of Agrarian Reform, the Ministry of Social Welfare, the Ministry of Labor and the Ministry of Interior. The National Recruiting and Civil Defense Commissions were abolished.

Recent counter-revolutionary activity has been centered in the Sierra de los Organos of Pinar

of the State. Mr. Johnson, who was appointed in February, 1958, plans to become a professional artist. He has been an amateur artist for many years. He is thinking of studying at the National Academy of Art and is planning a one-man exhibit of his paintings.

Mr. Johnson, 54 years old, may leave before Christmas, said to be the approximate date of departure also for Nell H. McElroy, Secretary of Defense. When Mr. Johnson was appointed, he indicated he would not remain longer than eighteen months to two years.

Agency Is Controversial

Mr. Johnson, who was an executive with the General Electric Company before coming to the Pentagon, is said to be staying on chiefly to assure a stable program for his agency.

The unit, sometimes referred to as the Pentagon's space agency, has been a subject of confusion and controversy ever since it was created. Mr. Johnson was its first director.

Last month, for example, he and Dr. Herbert York, the Pentagon's director of research and engineering, held a press conference to announce that the agency was restoring four ma-

Continued on Page 42, Column 3

bo-fan, is said to be quieter and more powerful than the turbo-jet. It will go into use early next year.

The turbo-fan engine draws in more cold air than is used in its combustion chamber, and ejects gas at a slower speed than does a turbo-jet engine. The lesser speed and the effect of the cold air on the hot gas reduce the noise.

John R. Wiley, president of the Airport Operators Council, said yesterday that a resolution on the turbo-fan had been adopted by the council last Tuesday in San Antonio, Tex. The council's fifty members include airports in New York, Los Angeles, Chicago, Philadelphia, St. Louis and Cincinnati. The airport operators also said the fact that the new engines have extra power could help in halting the demands for ever-expanding runways for jets.

Warn Against Diversion

They warned against diverting the power gain simply to more speed, range or load just for greater profits.

Mr. Wiley, director of aviation for the Port of New York Authority, said the industry had heretofore "come perilously close to producing aircraft that under certain operating conditions might have approached uselessness in some communities."

The airports' action came after many complaints were made here last summer about noise from both jet and piston planes. This was despite a wide variety of anti-noise efforts by the airlines, the Federal Aviation Agency and the Port Authority, operator of the major airfields here.

The central complaint center of the National Air Transport Coordinating Committee received 628 complaints in July, 610 in August and 384 in September about operations from New York International Airport, Idlewild, Queens, alone. This compared with 788 Idlewild complaints for all of 1958.

Representative Albert H. Bosch, Republican of Queens, who wants mandatory Federal anti-noise regulations, said he had received 10,000 letters of complaint in the last year.

New York has the world's

Continued on Page 72, Column 1

premise, that all programs, feeling substantial prize whether quiz, panel, audiotape participation or contest show are inherently dishonest.

These program forms will all parallel the life or broadcast, radio, as well as vision. Millions of Americans like and want them.

Implicit in its response to C. B. S. plan was the N. B. C. intention to retain the ten-hour weekday shows of type that it now televises.

Three cancellations. Dore Frank Stanton, president of the C. B. S., announced the cancellation of the big-prize quiz shows Friday in a speech in New Orleans. The network last

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It was understood, however, that other quiz and panel shows offering lesser prizes would be retained. These include such shows as "I've Got a Secret," "What's My Line" and "To Tell the Truth."

It is not clear to N. B. C. at this time how far the C. B. S. action as intended to go. N. B. C. commented yesterday "If it involves dropping only one or two daytime quiz shows we do not consider it particularly significant."

Pays Unusual Tribute

In an unusual tribute to a rival network's programs, N. B. C. noted that if the C. B. S. policy meant "blanket application to such popular nighttime quiz and contest favorites as 'I've Got a Secret' and 'What's My Line,' then we think millions of Americans will be the losers by it."


N. B. C., which made its comments in a statement issued by the network without being signed by any one company executive, questioned the price level below which integrity might be guaranteed.

"If it [C. B. S.] exempts prizes that offer \$1,000 in prizes ('To Tell the Truth') and pans shows that offer \$2,500 ('Top Dollar'), then we consider it confusing," the statement said. "Can honesty be equated with the size of a prize?"

N. B. C. went on to say: "We

Continued on Page 45, Column 3

War Glory a Memory, Navy Carriers Start Tow to Japan



LET REVERTING O MALENKOV AIM

New Consumer Goods Policy
Is Similar to '53 Program
Opposed by Khrushchev

By HARRY SCHWARTZ

The new Soviet program to increase production of consumer goods appears to mark a final step in Premier Khrushchev's return to the economic policies of his ousted rival, former Premier Georgi M. Malenkov.

The new Soviet decree on production published last Friday is in many ways similar to a decree on the same subject issued Oct. 28, 1953, during the Malenkov regime. It calls for an immediate increase in production of consumer goods, new designs and better quality. It sets, as a goal for 1962 a level of consumer goods production 42 per cent higher than that of 1958.

Mr. Khrushchev, as First Secretary of the Communist party, led the fight against Mr. Malenkov and his consumer goods program in late 1954 and early 1955. As a result, the first post-Stalin program for a rapid rise in Soviet living standards was scrapped, and Mr. Malenkov resigned as Premier in February, 1955.

Military Loss Was Noted

Premier Khrushchev's contention five years ago was that the Malenkov program threatened the primacy of heavy industry, which Stalin had made the cardinal law of Soviet economic development.

Foreign observers noted at the time that the Malenkov program implied the diversion of manpower and scarce materials from military to consumer goods production. They noted that this was particularly so in the case of durable consumer goods, such as washing machines and vacuum cleaners, requiring metals and engineering talent that could otherwise be applied to military production.

Premier Khrushchev returned in subsequent years to the Malenkov consumer policy with regard to other goods less directly competitive with military fields. Thus, more than a year ago he announced an expansion of chemical production, which is to serve as the base for increasing the supply of textiles and plastics for Soviet consumers.

Khrushchev Changes

In the light of the new decree, it appears clear that Premier Khrushchev believes the Soviet Union can now better afford to devote resources to durable consumer goods production than it could earlier. In the period since he forced a reversal of the Malenkov line, Soviet heavy industry and economic strength have grown substantially and Soviet military power has been built up greatly with advanced weapons. How drastically the Malenkov

Text of U. S. Protest on Moscow Incident

Special to The New York Times.
WASHINGTON, Oct. 17—Following is the text of a State Department statement today on the ouster by the Soviet Union of an official of the United States Embassy in Moscow:

On the morning of Oct. 16, 1959, unidentified Soviet authorities seized Mr. Russell A. Langelie, attaché of the Embassy of the United States of America at Moscow, and forcibly detained him for about one hour and forty-five minutes.

The Chargé d'Affaires of the United States at Moscow, Mr. Edward L. Freers, delivered to the Soviet Ministry of Foreign Affairs in the afternoon of Oct. 16 a note of protest reading as follows:

"The Embassy of the United States of America presents its compliments to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics and has the honor to protest the forcible seizure of Mr. Russell A. Langelie, attaché of the United States Embassy in Moscow, on the morning of Oct. 16, 1959, by unidentified Soviet authorities. Mr. Langelie was subjected to forcible detention, to threats of violence against himself and against his family, to forcible search, to attempted interrogation, and to attempts to enlist his cooperation in intelligence activities against the United States.

'Account of the Incident'

"The following is a factual account of the incident:

"Approximately at 9 o'clock on the morning of Oct. 16, Mr. Langelie alighted from a bus, No. 107, at the stop at Chalkovskovo Street and Vorovskovo Street. He was immediately surrounded by five men in civilian clothing who seized his arms, covered his mouth, and forcibly dragged and carried him to a Zim automobile parked in a nearby alley. He was then driven to a near-by building on Vorovskovo Street, where the men forced him to leave the automobile and enter the building.

"Mr. Langelie produced his diplomatic card, protested the forcible seizure and asked to be allowed to communicate with the American Embassy. The Soviet individuals laughed at the document and ignored Mr. Langelie's request.

"Mr. Langelie was then forced to remove his topcoat, which was searched by the men. One of the men produced a notebook, which he said belonged to Mr. Langelie, but which, in fact, Mr. Langelie had never seen before. The man used a chemical solution on the pages of the notebook to develop supposedly concealed writing and then iden-



'UNDESIRABLE' TO SOVIET: Russell A. Langelie, U. S. Embassy security officer, shown strolling in Moscow, has been accused of espionage by Soviet authorities and ordered to leave. In the background is St. Basil's Cathedral.

tified the writing as referring to Soviet state secrets. Thereupon he accused Mr. Langelie of engaging in espionage activities against the Soviet Union.

"Thereupon the man attempted to interrogate Mr. Langelie about his duties in the embassy. When Mr. Langelie refused to enter into any conversation with them, they began to threaten him. They asserted that Mr. Langelie's diplomatic immunity had been revoked and that he therefore was subject to imprisonment. They threatened him with physical violence. They also threatened to make unspecified action against his wife and three small children, who reside with him in Moscow.

"When Mr. Langelie continued to refuse to enter into conversation, the men then sought at length to enlist his cooperation in undertaking intelligence activities on behalf of the Soviet Union against the United States and promised him monetary reward.

"After approximately one hour and forty-five minutes of such threats and promises,

the men escorted Mr. Langelie from the building to the same automobile. He was driven to Vostaniya Square, where he was permitted to leave the automobile.

"The embassy strongly protests this flagrant violation of diplomatic immunity. It expects the Ministry to take the necessary measures to prevent any repetition of such an incident and to bring to account those responsible."

At the time of delivery of the note, the deputy chief of the Ministry's American section stated to Mr. Freers that "competent" Soviet authorities had informed the ministry, Mr. Langelie had used his stay in the U. S. S. R. to carry out intelligence work not compatible with his diplomatic status and that, in view of the impermissibility of such action, the Soviet Government considered Mr. Langelie's further stay in the U. S. S. R. undesirable.

Although Mr. Langelie is thus obliged to leave the Soviet Union, the United States Government rejects the Soviet accusation against him and protests these improper actions of the Soviet authorities.

U.S. EMBASSY AIDE OUSTED BY SOVIET

Continued From Page 1, Col. 1

got off bus No. 107 at the corner of Chalkovskovo Street and Vorovskovo Street. This stop is about a block from the United States chancery, which is ten or fifteen minutes by auto from the Kremlin.

There, five men, in civilian clothes, accosted him, seized his arms, covered his mouth and dragged him to a car parked near by, the account said.

Mr. Langelie was driven to a near-by building where he produced his credentials, protested his treatment and demanded to be allowed to communicate with the embassy. According to the embassy account, this brought laughter from the Russians.

They searched him, the report said, and produced a notebook said to be the American's, poured a solution on the pages to develop supposedly hidden writing and identified the writing as "Soviet state secrets."

The Russians tried to question Mr. Langelie about his duties, the State Department related, and when he refused to answer he was told that his diplomatic immunity had been revoked and that he could be imprisoned.

Thereupon, it was said, they threatened him with violence and also threatened unspecified actions against his wife and three children, who are in Moscow.

Having failed to get Mr. Langelie to talk, the men tried to persuade him to engage in espionage against the United States and promised him money if he would do so, the report said.

After an hour and forty-five minutes of unavailing threats and promises, the men took Mr. Langelie from the building to the car, drove him to Vostaniya Square and let him out.

Mr. Langelie went to the embassy and told his story to embassy officials. In the afternoon, Edward L. Freers, the United States Chargé d'Affaires, delivered a note of protest setting forth the incident to the Foreign Ministry.

Mr. Freers was told that "competent" Soviet authorities had established that Mr. Langelie had been engaged in espionage work and that the Soviet Union must therefore request his departure.

Mr. Langelie, a Foreign Service reserve officer, has been in the service for only three years. His first assignment—from September, 1956, until January, 1958—was in Vienna. He has been in Moscow since.

He served in the Navy during World War II, and again from 1952 to 1955, reaching the rank of lieutenant commander.

The most recent expulsion of a Soviet diplomat was on June 6, 1958. Nikolai I. Kurouchkin, no third secretary at the Soviet Embassy, was declared persona non grata on charges of having paid hundreds of dollars to an American journalist for im-

goal was originally 483,000 units; actual production in 1958 was 246,000. For electric irons 1955 goal was set at 4,375,000 units, but production last year 2,089,000. It was only last year that output of refrigerators and sewing machines finally ex-

officers and others who could afford the relatively high prices for such goods as vacuum cleaners and washing machines.

Premier Khrushchev's new effort appears to be a bid for support from a somewhat larger group. This is indicated not only

but also by the fact that early this month the Soviet Government inaugurated a limited system of installment buying for expensive goods.

Thus, as production of these durable goods increases in the months ahead, a larger propor-

Withdrawn Item

from the records of the
JFK Assassination Records Review Board

Case Number: NND99305 K
Series: Gunn
Box #: 3
Folder: RP / Langelie
Date: n.d.
Subject: Handwritten Notes
Pages: 2

Authority: *PL 102-526*

§6(1) _____	Special Media _____
§6(2) _____	Other _____
§6(3) _____	CIA
§6(4) _____	
§6(5) _____	

RELEASED PER EXECUTIVE ORDER 11652
NARA JG DATE 03/21/08Date : 09/22/98
Page : 1JFK ASSASSINATION SYSTEM
IDENTIFICATION FORM-----
AGENCY INFORMATIONAGENCY : FBI
RECORD NUMBER : 124-10279-10214
RECORDS SERIES : HQ
AGENCY FILE NUMBER : CR 65-68616-13*Online*-----
DOCUMENT INFORMATIONORIGINATOR : FBI
FROM : SAC, WMFO
TO : DIRECTOR, FBI
TITLE :
DATE : 09/17/64
PAGES : 7
SUBJECTS : [RESTRICTED]DOCUMENT TYPE : PAPER, TEXTUAL DOCUMENT
CLASSIFICATION : SECRET
RESTRICTIONS : 1B
CURRENT STATUS : RELEASED WITH DELETIONS
DATE OF LAST REVIEW : 09/22/98
OPENING CRITERIA : APPROVAL OF CIA
COMMENTS : INC LHM

OPTIONAL FORM NO. 10
MAY 1962 EDITION
GSA GEN. REG. NO. 27

5010-106

UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

Memorandum

TO : DIRECTOR, FBI (65-68616)

FROM : SAC, WFO (65-9225) (RUC)

SUBJECT: HOWARD JAMES SOCHUREK
ESPIONAGE - R
(OO:NY)

~~SECRET~~

DATE: 9/17/64

CIA HAS NO OBJECTION TO
DECLASSIFICATION AND/OR
RELEASE OF CIA INFORMATION
IN THIS DOCUMENT. EXCEPT FOR the brackets
ON pg. 2 KP 1-22-98

Classified by 5744/2
Declassify on: OADR-SF10

ReWFOlet and LHM dated 7/24/64; WFOairtel 8/7/64. (u)

Enclosed for the Bureau are five copies of a
LHM dated and captioned as above, and two copies of the
LHM for New York. (u)

WF T-1 in enclosed LHM is [Sammy] (u)

RUSSELL A. LANGELE was interviewed by SA AUBREY
S. BRENT at Central Intelligence Agency (CIA), Langley,
Virginia. (u)

LANGELE advised that SOCHUREK was known to
Ambassador LLEWELLYN E. THOMPSON when he was in Moscow and
may have been known to former Minister Counselor RICHARD H.
DAVIS and HANS TUCH, who was the Cultural Attache at the
United States Embassy in Moscow when subject was there.
LANGELE stated that TUCH was with the United States
Information Agency in Washington, D. C., at the present
time but while he was Cultural Attache in Moscow, he may
have dealt with American correspondents. (u)

LANGELE stated that former Minister Counselor
DAVIS left Moscow in July, 1959, and was succeeded by ED
FREERS. LANGELE advised he did not believe that Ambassador
THOMPSON ever discussed this matter with FREERS and that
possibly THOMPSON did not discuss this matter with DAVIS
inasmuch as DAVIS left before the correspondents were
approached by the Soviets in Russia. However, LANGELE
feels that DAVIS would have been in on the State Department
side when the Department received Ambassador THOMPSON's
"Top Secret" telegram of 8/10/59. (u)

- ENCLOSURE
- 2 - Bureau (Enc. 5)
 - 2 - New York (65-23165) (Enc. 2) (RM)
 - 1 - Washington Field

21 SEP 18 1964

ASB:nln
(5)

Classified by 3832
Exempt from GDS, Category 2, 3
Date of Declassification Indefinite

SOVIET SECTION

3 OCT 9 1964

~~SECRET~~

APPROPRIATE AGENCIES
AND FIELD OFFICES
ADVISED BY ROUTING
SLIP (S) OF CLASSIFICATION
DATE 8/15/78 LLS/lag

3-21-98
5468 SUB/108
(77K)

WFO 65-9225

The State Department information operator on 9/9/64, confirmed the listing of RICHARD H. DAVIS in the February, 1964, Telephone Directory of the State Department which listing reveals that RICHARD H. DAVIS is presently Deputy Assistant Secretary of the Bureau of European Affairs.

LANGELLE stated that he knew PRISCILLA POST JOHNSON and ROBERT W. GIBSON by face but never associated with them in Russia. He recalls that he may have talked to GIBSON in a general security orientation session before GIBSON reported [REDACTED] He explained that he had this security session with GIBSON because GIBSON's wife was quite attractive and had departed Russia leaving GIBSON a bachelor in Moscow. LANGELLE thought that GIBSON might be a target for the Russians in view of the fact his wife had left him a bachelor because of marital troubles. LANGELLE does not recall that GIBSON mentioned anything concerning SOCHUREK or any other correspondents during the security orientation session.

LANGELLE explained that he exercised no authority over any Americans who were not employed at the United States Embassy. He said that he could not order these people to do or to refrain from doing anything. He could only talk to them informally at their own volition. Therefore, he was unable to call in SOCHUREK for an interview even if he had desired to do so. (u)

LANGELLE advised that he did not receive a reply to his 8/14/59 letter to the Department of State and he thought that if he had received a reply he would remember it. He had no knowledge what, if any, action was taken by the State Department upon receipt of his letter. He was sure a copy of his letter reached CIA through the Security Office of the State Department. (u)

Mr. LLEWELLYN E. THOMPSON, former Ambassador to Russia and now Deputy Undersecretary of State for Political Affairs, was interviewed on 8/25/64, by SAs MAURICE A. TAYLOR and BRENT. Ambassador THOMPSON advised that either ED FREERS or RICHARD DAVIS was the Counselor at the United States Embassy in Moscow and since he, THOMPSON, usually talked to his Counselor, he may have told DAVIS about the Soviet approach to SOCHUREK. Ambassador THOMPSON believed that DAVIS was Counselor when this occurred. (u)

DECLASSIFIED per DAS
ON 9-16-97



CTA Code

NARA JG DATE 03/21/08

WFO 65-9225

~~SECRET~~

Inasmuch as Ambassador THOMPSON appears to be the original source of information regarding this case and since he has been interviewed, WFO does not contemplate interviewing RICHARD H. DAVIS or HANS TUCH unless requested to do so by the Bureau or New York. *(u) DECLASSIFIED PER DOS ON 9-16-97*

ReBulet 3/10/64, requested WFO to discuss information from Sammy concerning SOCHUREK with Sammy in future interviews. Inasmuch as Sammy is not available to WFO for interview and since CIA has been interviewing this source concerning subjects of interest to the Bureau, the Bureau may desire to have CIA interview the source for any additional information regarding SOCHUREK. *[S](u)*

The LHM has been classified "Top Secret" because it contains information extracted from Ambassador THOMPSON's telegram of 8/10/59, which was so classified.

~~SECRET~~